LogicalMANIPULATIVE

Two Wrongs Make a Right

What it is

Justifying a wrong action by pointing to a comparable wrong committed by someone else — usually the accuser or the victim — as if the earlier wrong licensed the later one.

How it works

The form is: they did X, or something like it, to us; therefore our doing X is justified. Govier (2010) treats “two wrongs” as its own fallacy of relevance, distinct from the tu quoque: the tu quoque says “you are a hypocrite, so your criticism fails,” while two-wrongs says “your side did it first, so our doing it is fine.” Neither shows that the act is right. The lever is reciprocity turned inward — the sense of fairness that makes retaliation feel like balance rather than a second offense — together with the moral-disengagement mechanism Bandura (1999) called advantageous comparison, in which an act looks acceptable next to a worse one. The line to draw: a genuine argument from precedent says that a norm has changed and both sides are now bound by the new one, which is a claim about rules; two-wrongs says a wrong is available to me because it was available to them, which is a claim about permission. The honest version is grievance reasoning in an escalating conflict. The knowing version uses the opponent's record as a permanent licence, so that any misconduct can be justified by finding a precedent. The tell is a defense that never says the act was right, only that the other side did it too.

Real-world examples

  • Partisan gerrymandering after the 2020 census was defended in Illinois by Democrats and in Texas by Republicans with the same argument — the other party does it where it holds power — which established only that both parties do it.
  • Senate procedural escalation followed the pattern for a decade: Democrats abolished the filibuster for most nominations in 2013 citing Republican obstruction; Republicans extended the change to Supreme Court nominations in 2017 citing the 2013 precedent. Each step was argued from the other side's prior wrong.
  • In trade disputes, retaliatory tariffs are justified as answering the other country's tariffs; the retaliation may or may not be good policy, but its being a response does not settle that question.
  • A company defends deceptive pricing by noting that competitors do the same; regulators do not accept industry prevalence as a defense, and neither does the logic.
  • In a relationship, one partner's infidelity is offered as justification for the other's: the earlier betrayal explains the later one without excusing it.

Ethical guidelines

  • If an act is wrong when they do it, it is wrong when you do it; state the reason the act is acceptable, not the precedent for it.
  • Distinguish arguing that the norm has changed (which binds you too) from claiming a licence the other side does not have.
  • Where retaliation is a considered strategy, defend it as strategy — what it achieves and at what cost — rather than as an entitlement.
  • Do not use an opponent's record as a standing permission slip; the precedent argument, once accepted, has no stopping point.

How to defend against it

  • Ask the direct question: “Was it right when they did it?” If no, ask how it became right; if yes, ask why it was condemned at the time.
  • Separate the two acts and evaluate each on its own; a second wrong does not cancel the first, and the first does not authorize the second.
  • Ask about the stopping rule: “If their doing it justifies our doing it, what justifies our stopping?” Escalation arguments have no natural end, and saying so makes that visible.
  • When the response is a real strategy (deterrence, reciprocity), ask for the strategic case — the expected effect on the other side's behavior — instead of the moral licence.
  • Name the move in your own reasoning: “I want to do this because they did” is a feeling, not an argument, and is usually the moment to slow the decision.

From the Defense Playbook

Every playbook entry states how strong its evidence is and when not to use it. Browse the full playbook.

References

  1. Govier, T. (2010). A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Wadsworth / Cengage
    The treatment of “two wrongs make a right” as a distinct fallacy of relevance alongside the tu quoque.
  2. Walton, D. (1998). Ad Hominem Arguments. University of Alabama Press
    The analysis of the tu quoque and its “two wrongs” variant, and the conditions under which such replies fail.
  3. Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193-209
    The advantageous-comparison mechanism by which an act is made acceptable by contrast with a worse one.
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