PsychologicalDUAL-USE
Scope Insensitivity
What it is
The failure of valuations, emotions, and willingness to pay to scale with the size of a problem — two thousand, twenty thousand, and two hundred thousand affected can feel, and be valued, almost the same.
How it works
Real-world examples
- •Desvousges and colleagues (1992): willingness to pay to save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 migratory birds was statistically indistinguishable — a hundredfold difference in scope produced almost no difference in value.
- •Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson and Friedrich (1997): a medical program that would save 4,500 lives was judged more worthwhile when the at-risk population was 11,000 than when it was 250,000; the same lives were worth less as a proportion than as a number.
- •Public estimates of US foreign aid have for decades placed it near a quarter of the federal budget, against an actual share of about one percent; politicians on both sides have proposed cutting it as if the savings were large, and earmark scandals — the 2005 Alaska “bridge to nowhere”, the 2011 “shrimp on a treadmill” report — drew more outrage than entitlement lines a thousand times larger.
- •Charity appeals that describe one child or one village raise more than appeals that describe a million, and the research suggests adding the million can lower giving; the sector's reliance on prototypes is a rational response to the bias, and a reason to check the scale yourself.
- •Insurance for a vivid single risk — flight insurance, a phone screen, an extended warranty — is bought at prices far above expected loss, while coverage for the large, dull, catastrophic risks that would actually ruin the buyer is under-purchased.
- •A partner's or manager's reaction to a mistake is often sized to how the mistake feels rather than to what it cost; the same insensitivity lets a small vivid failure and a large invisible one draw the same response.
Ethical guidelines
Where the line is
Making a quantity vivid with one example is honest when the quantity is also stated and the example is representative; the line is crossed when a persuader relies on the audience's insensitivity to scale — inflating a trivial sum into an outrage or shrinking an enormous one into a footnote — so that the decision is made on the prototype rather than the number.
- ●State the number, the base, and the unit — deaths per year, dollars per person, percent of the budget — whenever you ask people to care about a quantity; the prototype is not the argument.
- ●Do not present a rounding error as a scandal or a major line as a footnote; if the outrage you generate would reverse if the audience saw the proportions, it is manufactured.
- ●Using a single case to make a large number comprehensible is legitimate; using it to hide the number is not.
- ●When you sell protection against a vivid risk, disclose the size of the risk next to the price.
How to defend against it
- ►Ask “how many, out of how many, over what period?” of every alarming or heart-warming figure; then convert it to a per-person or per-year rate you can compare with something familiar.
- ►Put budget numbers on a common scale — percent of the total — before judging them; a million, a billion, and a trillion are not different flavors of large.
- ►Decide how much to give or spend by multiplying: what one life or one unit is worth to you, times the number affected; feelings will not do the multiplication for you, and that is the whole problem.
- ►When a pitch offers a face and no count, ask for the count; when it offers a count and no base, ask for the base.
- ►Insure against the catastrophic and dull, not the vivid and small; the vividness of a risk is not its size.
References
- Desvousges, W. H., Johnson, F. R., Dunford, R. W., Boyle, K. J., Hudson, S. P., & Wilson, K. N. (1992). Measuring nonuse damages using contingent valuation: An experimental evaluation of accuracy. Research Triangle Institute Monograph 92-1The migratory-bird study in which willingness to pay did not scale with the number of birds saved.
- Kahneman, D., & Knetsch, J. L. (1992). Valuing public goods: The purchase of moral satisfaction. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 22(1), 57-70The moral-satisfaction account of why stated values ignore scope.
- Fetherstonhaugh, D., Slovic, P., Johnson, S. M., & Friedrich, J. (1997). Insensitivity to the value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3), 283-300Psychophysical numbing for human lives and the proportion-versus-number finding.
- Hsee, C. K., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2004). Music, pandas, and muggers: On the affective psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(1), 23-30 · linkEvidence that affect-based valuation is nearly flat with respect to quantity.
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