PoliticalDUAL-USE

Law-and-Order Rhetoric

What it is

Making crime and disorder the organizing frame of a political appeal, so that fear of crime — rather than measured crime — drives support for a candidate or for expanded police, prosecutorial, or emergency powers.

How it works

The frame works because fear of crime tracks media exposure and vivid cases more closely than it tracks victimization rates. Gallup has asked Americans since 1989 whether crime is rising nationally; in most years a majority has said yes, including through the 1990s and 2010s when recorded violent crime fell by roughly half. Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) showed experimentally that exposure to local television crime news, especially with a Black suspect, raised support for punitive policies and racialized attributions. Beckett (1997) traced how "law and order" moved from Goldwater's 1964 campaign through Nixon's to become a bipartisan idiom by the 1990s, arguing that public concern often followed elite initiative rather than preceding it. The technique is not the discussion of crime, which is a legitimate and central subject of government; it is the substitution of fear for measurement — vivid cases in place of trends, the criminal as a type rather than a person, and remedies whose efficacy is asserted rather than shown. Its dual-use character is real: genuine surges in disorder (the 1960s–1980s, the 2020–2021 homicide rise) create honest versions of the appeal, and the dishonest version borrows their credibility.

Real-world examples

  • Barry Goldwater made "crime in the streets" a national theme in 1964; Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign ran on "law and order" and the "silent majority"; and the 1988 Willie Horton advertisement, produced by an independent committee supporting George H. W. Bush and echoed by the campaign's own "revolving door" ad, attached the frame to a single furloughed prisoner.
  • The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was signed by Bill Clinton with broad bipartisan support, while in Britain Tony Blair's 1993 formula "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime" adopted the frame for the center-left.
  • Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippine presidency in 2016 on a promise to kill drug dealers, and Nayib Bukele's state of exception in El Salvador (from 2022) — mass detention with suspended due process — has drawn domestic approval ratings above 80 percent alongside a documented collapse in homicides and documented arbitrary detentions.
  • The 2020–2021 U.S. homicide increase produced honest versions of the appeal (a real, measurable rise) and dishonest ones (claims about particular cities that the data did not support); in 2024 majorities still told Gallup that crime was rising nationally while FBI figures showed it falling.

Historical case studies

The "Weekend Passes" (Willie Horton) ad

1988US Presidential Campaign

William Horton, serving life without parole for murder in Massachusetts, absconded from a weekend furlough in 1986 and the following year raped a Maryland woman and assaulted her fiancé. In the 1988 campaign an independent committee supporting George H. W. Bush ran a television ad built around Horton's mugshot, while the Bush campaign's own "Revolving Door" spot attacked the furlough programme without naming him. The programme had been created under a Republican governor, and most states and the federal system had similar ones; Governor Michael Dukakis had, however, vetoed a bill to exclude first-degree murderers. Critics said the ad traded on racial fear, which its makers denied; campaign manager Lee Atwater expressed regret for the episode shortly before his death in 1991.

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The "superpredator" forecast

1995–2012US Juvenile Justice

In 1995 the political scientist John DiIulio, a Democrat, warned of a coming wave of remorseless juvenile "superpredators" and projected some 270,000 more of them on the streets by 2010. The term was taken up by politicians of both parties, among them First Lady Hillary Clinton in a 1996 speech and Republican sponsors of juvenile-crime bills in Congress, and nearly every state made it easier to try children as adults. Juvenile violent crime was in fact already falling and went on falling for two decades. DiIulio publicly regretted the prediction, and in 2012 he joined other criminologists in a Supreme Court brief, in Miller v. Alabama, stating that the forecast had been wrong.

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Ethical guidelines

Where the line is

Describing a real rise in crime with its numbers and proposing remedies whose effectiveness can be examined is legitimate law-and-order politics; the line is crossed when vivid cases substitute for trends, offenders are presented as a racial or class type, or powers are demanded whose effect on crime is asserted rather than shown.

  • Crime is a legitimate subject of politics and real increases deserve real responses; the obligation is to describe trends accurately, with the numbers, and to propose remedies with evidence.
  • Using a single vivid case to characterize a population or a policy — the furloughed prisoner, the released defendant — is card-stacking regardless of the case's truth.
  • Appeals that trade on racialized images of the offender carry a documented history and a foreseeable effect; communicators cannot disclaim what Gilliam and Iyengar measured.

How to defend against it

  • Check the trend, not the story: look up the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting or National Crime Victimization Survey figures (or your country's equivalent) for the period and place named, and compare the claim with the line.
  • Ask which specific measure is being proposed and what evidence links it to the outcome; "tough" is a tone, not a mechanism.
  • Notice the perception gap in yourself: if you believe crime is rising, ask where that belief came from — a chart or a news segment.
  • Watch for the accompanying powers: emergency measures, suspended due process, and expanded surveillance sold under the crime frame tend to outlast the emergency.

References

  1. Beckett, K. (1997). Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics. Oxford University Press
    The history of the frame from Goldwater onward and the argument that public concern often followed elite initiative.
  2. Gilliam, F. D., Jr., & Iyengar, S. (2000). Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public. American Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 560–573
    Experimental evidence that local crime news raised punitive attitudes and racialized attributions.
  3. Flamm, M. W. (2005). Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s. Columbia University Press
    The 1960s origins of the frame and its role in realigning national politics.
  4. Gallup (2023). Crime (Gallup Historical Trends). Gallup annual Crime survey, 1989–present
    The persistent majority belief that national crime is rising across years in which recorded crime fell.
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