Curse of Knowledge
What it is
Once you know something, you cannot fully imagine not knowing it — so the informed systematically overestimate what others know, how clear their own message is, and how obvious a conclusion was.
How it works
Real-world examples
- •Newton's 1990 Stanford experiment: “tappers” who drummed the rhythm of songs such as “Happy Birthday” predicted listeners would name about half of them; listeners identified roughly three in 120. The tapper hears the melody in her head; the listener hears knocking.
- •Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989): better-informed traders in an experimental market could not fully discount their private information when forecasting the uninformed, which reduced — though did not eliminate — their ability to profit from it.
- •Campaigns built by policy specialists often assume the case is self-evident: Elizabeth Warren's “I have a plan for that” in 2020 and Mitt Romney's 59-point economic plan in 2012 each lost the message contest to rivals with simpler slogans, and the 2016 Remain campaign in the UK leaned on economic forecasts it treated as decisive while Leave ran on “Take Back Control”.
- •Birch and Bloom (2007): adults who knew where an object had been moved were worse at predicting where a character who had not seen the move would look for it — the curse operating on plain false-belief reasoning, not only on expertise.
- •Fraud-prevention messaging written by investigators assumes the reader already knows what a spoofed caller ID or a demand for gift-card payment signifies; victims later say no one told them, and the investigators say everyone knows.
Ethical guidelines
Assuming shared knowledge is an honest mistake that every expert makes; the line is crossed when the informed party relies on the gap — burying terms in language they know will not be understood, or presenting a contested claim as what everyone knows — so that the other side's confusion becomes the persuader's advantage.
- ●Test your message on someone who does not know what you know before you send it; your own sense of its clarity is the least reliable measure available.
- ●Write contracts, consents, and warnings for the least-informed party who will be bound by them, and treat their failure to understand as your failure to explain.
- ●Do not use jargon to make the other side feel responsible for a gap you created; explaining is your job, not theirs.
- ●Introducing a claim with “as everyone knows” or “obviously” is legitimate only when it is actually uncontested; otherwise it is a way of making a question feel shameful.
How to defend against it
- ►When a document or pitch assumes knowledge you do not have, say so and ask for the plain version; the discomfort of asking is the curse working on you, and the other side's irritation is it working on them.
- ►Treat “obviously” and “as everyone knows” as flags: ask who established it, and read laterally to check whether it is actually common knowledge or one side's premise.
- ►Before signing anything, explain it back in your own words to the other party; if you cannot, you have not been informed, whatever the form says.
- ►When you are the expert, use the tapper test: assume the listener hears knocking, and supply the melody — the context, the base rate, the reason it matters.
- ►Prefer persuaders who can explain their conclusion from the ground up; refusal to do so is not evidence of depth.
From the Defense Playbook
When you argue across a political or cultural divide, make your honest case in terms of the values the listener actually holds, not your own, because arguments grounded in the other side's moral vocabulary are heard as arguments while those grounded in yours are heard as noise.
To understand what another person thinks or wants, ask them and listen, instead of imagining yourself in their shoes; imagining feels insightful but in controlled tests does not improve accuracy, while asking does.
Before launch, give people who did not build the campaign the explicit job of attacking it as a skeptical journalist, a regulator, a competitor, a harmed customer, and a bad actor would, and fix what they find while it is still cheap to fix.
Every playbook entry states how strong its evidence is and when not to use it. Browse the full playbook.
References
- Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, M. (1989). The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 97(5), 1232-1254 · linkOrigin of the term and the market experiment showing informed traders could not discount their knowledge.
- Heath, C., & Heath, D. (2007). Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die. Random HouseThe account of Newton's 1990 tapper-and-listener dissertation and its figures.
- Birch, S. A. J., & Bloom, P. (2007). The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs. Psychological Science, 18(5), 382-386Adults' knowledge of an outcome degrading their reasoning about another person's false belief.
- Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89(1), 25-41Evidence that adults interpret egocentrically even when they know the other person lacks their information.