Phishing
What it is
Mass-distributed fraudulent messages, usually email, that impersonate a trusted organization to trick recipients into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment, or entering credentials on a counterfeit site.
How it works
Real-world examples
- •The term dates to mid-1990s AOL, where attackers posing as staff messaged users for their passwords and billing details; the "ph" spelling follows the older hacker term "phreaking".
- •In March 2016 a message styled as a Google security alert led Hillary Clinton campaign chair John Podesta to a counterfeit login page, exposing years of email; in September 2020 Microsoft reported that state-backed groups had targeted both the Trump and Biden campaigns with phishing.
- •The 2013 Target breach began with a phishing email to a heating-and-cooling contractor, whose stolen network credentials opened a path to systems handling roughly 40 million payment cards.
- •Phishing kits sold on criminal forums let low-skill operators clone a bank or webmail login page in minutes; Google researchers tracking such kits in 2016-2017 identified more than 12 million potential victims in a single year.
- •QR-code phishing ("quishing") moves the same lure onto a printed sticker or an emailed image so that mail filters cannot read the link and the victim scans it on a phone with fewer security cues.
Ethical guidelines
- ●Phishing is fraud and, in most jurisdictions, a crime; there is no legitimate use outside authorized, consented security testing.
- ●Simulated phishing inside an organization is defensible only when employees know that simulations occur, the exercise is designed to teach rather than to shame, and results are never used to punish individuals.
- ●Security teams should avoid lures that exploit personal crises (bonuses, layoffs, health news) even in simulations; the damage to trust outlasts the lesson.
- ●Organizations that send legitimate email should stop training customers to click: avoid unannounced links, use consistent sender domains, and adopt DMARC so their brand is harder to counterfeit.
How to defend against it
- ►Do not use the link in the message. Open a new tab and type the organization's address yourself, or use the app you already have installed; if the alert is real, it will be waiting there.
- ►Read the sender domain character by character, from the right: the part immediately before the first single slash is the real domain, and "paypal.com.security-check.net" is not PayPal.
- ►Treat urgency plus a request for credentials, payment, or a download as the signature of the attack; legitimate organizations tolerate a delay while you verify.
- ►Turn on phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (passkeys or hardware security keys) for email, banking, and password-manager accounts; a stolen password alone then buys the attacker nothing.
- ►Use a password manager and let it autofill. It fills credentials only on the exact domain they were saved for, so a counterfeit page gets nothing.
- ►Report the message to your IT team or forward it to reportphishing@apwg.org and file at reportfraud.ftc.gov, then delete it; reporting is what gets counterfeit sites taken down.
From the Defense Playbook
Expose yourself in advance to a weakened, clearly labelled dose of a manipulation technique together with its refutation, so that when the full-strength version arrives you recognize the move instead of being carried by it.
Confirm any request that arrives through one channel (email, text, chat, a phone call) by reaching the supposed sender through a different channel you already trusted before the request existed.
When anyone contacts you claiming to be your bank, a government agency, a utility, or a company you deal with, hang up and call back on the number printed on your card, statement, or the organization's official website, never the number they gave you.
Turn on a second factor for every account that matters and prefer phishing-resistant forms (passkeys or hardware security keys), so that a password typed into a fake page or talked out of you on the phone is not enough to take the account.
Every playbook entry states how strong its evidence is and when not to use it. Browse the full playbook.
References
- Dhamija, R., Tygar, J. D., & Hearst, M. (2006). Why Phishing Works. Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 2006), 581-590 · linkUsability study showing that even attentive users misjudge counterfeit sites because attackers copy the very cues users rely on.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (2024). Internet Crime Report 2023. FBI IC3 · linkPhishing/spoofing as the most-reported crime type of 2023; overall reported losses exceeding 12.5 billion dollars.
- Verizon (2024). 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report. Verizon Business · linkMedian time to click a phishing link under one minute; human element involved in roughly two-thirds of breaches.
- Thomas, K., Li, F., Zand, A., Barrett, J., Ranieri, J., Invernizzi, L., Markov, Y., Comanescu, O., Eranti, V., Moscicki, A., Margolis, D., Paxson, V., & Bursztein, E. (2017). Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware? Understanding the Risks of Stolen Credentials. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2017) · linkScale of phishing-kit victimization (about 12.4 million potential victims in one year) and the account-hijacking risk of phished credentials.
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