MFA Fatigue Attack
What it is
An account takeover in which an attacker who already has a password floods the victim with repeated multi-factor push notifications, wearing them down or confusing them into approving one.
How it works
Real-world examples
- •In September 2022 a Lapsus$ actor used an Uber contractor's stolen password, bombarded them with MFA prompts for hours, then posed as IT on WhatsApp telling them to approve; the contractor complied and the attacker reached internal systems.
- •The same group used push-bombing against other technology firms in 2022, pairing credential theft with relentless approval requests.
- •A user asleep at night wakes to a dozen "approve sign-in?" alerts and taps approve to silence the phone, unknowingly admitting the attacker.
- •Attackers sometimes send a single well-timed prompt right after impersonating the help desk, so the victim expects and approves it.
Historical case studies
Ethical guidelines
- ●Spamming approval prompts to bypass another person's MFA is unauthorized access and fraud; there is no legitimate use.
- ●Organizations that deploy tap-to-approve MFA owe users a more resistant configuration once push bombing is known, rather than blaming the tricked employee.
- ●Any accompanying "IT" contact urging approval is impersonation and compounds the offense.
How to defend against it
- ►Never approve a login prompt you did not personally initiate; unexpected prompts mean someone already has your password, so treat them as an alarm and change it.
- ►Push for number-matching MFA, which makes you type a code shown on the real login screen, so blind "approve" taps cannot admit an attacker.
- ►Prefer phishing-resistant factors (passkeys or hardware security keys) for critical accounts, which are immune to prompt flooding.
- ►Report a burst of unexpected prompts to your IT team immediately, and do not trust a follow-up call or message telling you to approve; real IT will not ask that.
- ►Rate-limit and alert on repeated MFA prompts at the organization level so a flood is detected rather than endured.
From the Defense Playbook
Every playbook entry states how strong its evidence is and when not to use it. Browse the full playbook.
References
- Uber Technologies (2022). Security update. Uber Newsroom · linkCompany account of the September 2022 breach beginning with a contractor approving MFA prompts after push bombing and fake-IT contact.
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) (2022). Implementing Number Matching in MFA Applications. CISA · linkRecommendation of number-matching MFA to defeat push-bombing and blind-approval attacks.
- Doerfler, P., Thomas, K., Marincenko, M., Ranieri, J., Jiang, Y., Moscicki, A., & McCoy, D. (2019). Evaluating Login Challenges as a Defense Against Account Takeover. Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW 2019) · linkEvidence that phishing-resistant factors outperform prompt-based challenges against targeted takeover.
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